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Summary
Anticompetitive horizontal behaviors are very common and harmful for economy 
as a whole and consumer welfare especially. Such behaviors in most cases mean collu-
sion. Pro-active anticompetitive policy we want to realize implies monitoring of huge 
set of markets and industries. As preliminary selection is possible on a basis of num-
ber of  factors that enhanced collusion, there could be still big set of  industries left. 
There is  a necessity then for methods of  collusion’s detection which would be quick, 
resource — saving and understandable for economists, experts and lawyers without 
quantitative experience. We described here fairly simple but meaningful, graphical 
tools which could be used in process of  screening for collusive behavior in  the mar-
kets. We underlined that ability of graphical inspection depends on statistical/econo-
metric tool of  choice for particular screen, so we see a  need for research and popu-
larization of  tools with that property.
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The purpose of  this paper is  pointing out for fairly simple but mean-
ingful, graphical tools which could be used in  screening for collusive behav-
ior in  the  markets. Such tools may be especially interesting for wide range 
of economists and lawyers who participate in anticompetitive procedures and 
want to make quick evaluation of the situation. We would like to point in this 
paper to three collusion cases and examples of  screen and tools used that al-
lowed graphical assessment of collusion possibility. We give short description 
of  the case and screen, theoretical motivation and graphical assessment.
1. the currentState of knoWledge
1.1. Horizontal anticompetitive practices
Competition can be defined as a process of rivalry between suppliers that 
takes place either in  the  market or for the  market. Firms compete to at-
tract customers by offering lower prices, higher quality of products or servic-
es, or innovative products and services. When competition is  working effec-
tively, the market will send clear messages to firms (for example, in  the  form 
of the prices they can charge and the profits they can earn) about which goods 
and services consumers want to buy. Efficient firms offering the products con-
sumers want at low prices will prosper, and inefficient ones will not. Free 
competition enhances productivity in  industries1. Free competition boosts in-
 1 For empirical evidence see J. Haskel, Imperfect Competition, Work Practices and Productivity 
Growth, „Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and Statistics”, Vol.  53, No.  3/1991, pp.  265–279; 
S.J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, „Journal of  Political Economy”, Vol.  104, 
No.  4/1996, pp.  724–746; D. Blanchflower, S. Machin, Product market competition, wag-
es and productivity: international evidence from establishment-level data, Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion Paper, No.  286/1996. pp.  1–38; M. Maher, M. Wise, Product Market 
Competition and Economic Performance in  the United Kingdom, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, Vol.  2005, pp.  1–53; I. Ehrlich, G. Gallais-Hammono, Z. Liu, R. Lutter, 
Productivity growth and firm ownership: an analytical and empirical investigation, „Journal 
of Political Economy”, Vol. 102, No. 5/1994, pp. 1006–1038; G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta, Product 
Market Reforms and Employment in OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No. 472/2005, pp. 1–50.
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novation2 and quality. And last but not least, as Adam Smith noted3 free com-
petition drives commodity prices to its “natural level” which is:(…) “the lowest 
which can be taken, not upon every occasion, indeed, but for any considerable 
time together” and (…)”is the  lowest (price) which the  sellers can common-
ly afford to take, and at the  same time continue their business”. In  the  same 
seminal work of Smith4we can read very clearly early concern that firm spe-
cific conduct might allow industries to collect economic profit over the  long 
run natural level: ”(…) People of  the  same trade seldom meet together, even 
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against 
the  public, or in  some contrivance to raise prices”. In present times we de-
scribed such “conversations”, “conspiracy” and “contrivance” as anticompetitive 
practices which distort competition and welfare. Most of  such behaviors are 
prohibited by antitrust (competition) law. Especially harmful and in the same 
time the  most widespread5 are horizontal anticompetitive practices (agree-
ments) which encompass6:
−	 directly or indirectly fixing prices;
−	 fixing trading conditions;
−	 sharing markets;
−	 limiting or controlling production or investment;
−	 collusive tendering (bid-rigging);
−	 joint purchasing or selling;
−	 sharing information;
−	 exchanging price information;
−	 exchanging non-price information;
−	 restricting advertising;
−	 setting technical or design standards.
 2 P. Aghion, N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, P. Howitt, Competition and Innovation: 
an Inverted-U Relationship, „The Quarterly Journal of  Economics”, Vol.  120, No.  2/2005, 
pp. 701–728; M. Polder, E. Veldhuizen, Innovation and Competition in  the Netherlands: Testing 
the  Inverted U for Industries and Firms, „Journal of  Industry, Competition and Trade”, Vol. 12, 
No. 1/2012, pp. 67–91.
 3 A.  Smith, An Inquiry Into the  Nature and Causes of  the  Wealth of  Nations, The  Modern 
Library, New York 1937, p. 42.
 4 Ibidem, p. 80.
 5 About 43.0% o formal European Commission decisions on competition till year 2009 was 
connected with horizontal agreements. see: F. Russo, M.P. Schinkel, A.  Gunster, M. Carree, 
European Commission Decisions on Competition. Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and 
Merger Cases, Cambridge University Press, New York 2010. 
 6 Antitrust Division U.S. Department of  Justice, An antitrust primer for federal law enforce-
ment personnel, Washington 2005.
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Above list is by no means closed but exemplify the most popular horizon-
tal practices which infringement free competition. For European (and Polish) 
competition legislation leading role plays the  Treaty on  the  Functioning 
of  the  European Union (FEU Treaty). Competition rules are set out 
in Articles 101–106 of the FEU Treaty. Especially important in a case of hor-
izontal practices is  Article 101(1) FEU Treaty, which establishes the  pro-
hibition of  agreements and concerted practices among undertakings affect-
ing trade between Member States when restrictive of  competition within 
the  common market. The  boundary between the  concepts of  agreement and 
concerted practice is  still imprecise on  a ground of  law. The  key difference 
is  that a  concerted practice may exist where there is  informal co-operation 
without any formal agreement or decision. The category of horizontal agree-
ments includes hardcore cartel cases of  price fixing and market sharing, but 
also more sophisticated anticompetitive horizontal agreements such as joint 
sales agencies, agreements on  limiting marketing activities, capacity restric-
tions and other aspects of production, information sharing on prices and sales, 
service and distribution agreements, export cartels, and exclusionary practices 
toward entrants. It further extends to specialization and licensing agreements, 
trademarks, agreements on  (technical) standards, strategic alliances, trade as-
sociations, and the  joint organization of  exhibitions and fairs. While some 
of these forms of cooperation may have positive welfare effects, they also have 
an inherent danger of  leading to collusion. The  modern industrial economic 
and competition policy literature and case law distinguish two types of  col-
lusion — explicit and tacit collusion. The  latter occurs when firms under-
stand that if they compete less vigorously they can obtain market outcomes 
guaranteeing higher prices and thus higher profits without any direct inter-
action or communication to achieve a  collusive price. Tacit collusion can oc-
cur also at price levels other than the  joint profit maximizing level. In order 
to achieve the fully collusive price, firms can move from tacit collusion to ex-
plicit coordination. This would involve some form of  explicit communication 
between them, which in  turn might leave evidence of  the  antitrust infringe-
ment. The European cartel laws do in principle not extend to tacit collusion as 
they require evidence of an explicit cartel agreement. However, when primary 
goal is  to detect collusion the difference between legal interpretation (a  spe-
cific antitrust infringement) and economic understanding (a market outcome 
in  which prices and/or other characteristics differs negatively from competi-
tive level, independent of how this outcome is reached) of collusion is not so 
important as methods of collusion detection are based on the same statistical 
data which have to be observable.
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2. the methodology of reSearch
2.1. screening as a tool for anticompetitive practices detection
Detection of any horizontal agreement in an industry in general and col-
lusion in particular is not an easy task.
There is a reach set of theoretical models of overt or tacit collusion7 which 
describes very well as research hypotheses concerning players’ behavior, their 
empirical applications as collusion detection’s tools presents great difficulties. 
It happens mainly due to the  fact that the  players participating in  collusion 
have an advantageous position over the observer in the form of private infor-
mation. Moreover, the  resources of  public statistics are frequently (in a  case 
of  Poland, for example) very humble on  the  disaggregation level of  the  in-
dustry or individual players. Last but not least is  a problem of  scale. As car-
tel (and more broadly speaking) collusion detection could be reactive or pro-
active8 and reactive ones are not enough for collusion prevention, there is  a 
need to actively monitor huge set of  markets and industries. As preliminary 
selection is possible on a basis of number of  factors that enhanced (support-
ed) possibility of  tacit and overt anticompetitive horizontal agreements, such 
as a  small number of  firms, barrier to entry, spare capacity, cross-ownerships 
and other links among competitors, symmetry in  the  cost structure, dimen-
sion and organization of the firms, product homogeneity, and absent or weak 
buying power, transparency of  the  market there could be still big set of  in-
dustries left. In the other hand method used should be scientifically objective 
and (especially in  their quantitative part) understandable for non-econome-
tricians especially. Therefore, to actively monitor for collusion, good method 
should fulfill below mentioned postulates:
1.  it should have theoretical motivation implied by proper model of  strate-
gic interaction;
 7 For an comprehensive overview see for example: J. Tirole, The  Theory of  Industrial 
Organization, MIT Press, London 1998; X. Vives, Oligopoly pricing. Old ideas and new tools, 
MIT Press, Cambridge 1999.
 8 Reactive detection methods are based on information or evidence brought before the com-
petition agency by third parties. Leniency or amnesty programs are considered the most effec-
tive reactive detection measure, especially because they provide the  competition agency with 
direct evidence of  a cartel. Pro-active methods of  cartel detection are initiated from within 
the  agency and do not rely on  an external triggering events as customer complaints or factu-
al evidences from whistblowers. For cartel detection methods adopted by competition agen-
cies see: International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual, Chapter 4: Cartel 
Case Initiation, 2010. pp. 1–62.
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2.  it should use as small amount of  publically presented statistical data as 
it’s possible;
3.  it should not be resource intensive (it means, chip in terms of workload);
4.  it should provide understandable indications of  potentially collusive be-
havior, ideally in a graphical form.
Point 1 of  above list deals with method’s theoretical construction but 
points 2 to 4 depend on numerical (statistical, econometric) tool used for em-
pirical work. We have to underline this point, as there could be many tools 
for the same method to choose.
The methods which could fulfill the  above postulates are the  indirect 
methods of detecting collusion which are defined as collusion (cartel) screens 
(structural or behavioral)9. Structural approach typically involves screening 
a  series of  industries or markets in  the  attempt to identify those which ex-
hibit characteristics which make them more prone to collusion. Actual paper 
is  devoted to examples of  behavioral’s approach screens which are generally 
designed to flag firms behavior or market outcomes which may raise suspi-
cions that firms have in fact colluded. Cartel screens itself are economic tools 
designed to analyze observable economic data and information, such as in-
formation on various product and market characteristics, data on costs, prices, 
market shares, various aspects of  firm behavior, etc. and flag markets which 
may either have been affected by collusion. Abrantes-Metz and Bajari10 define 
a  screen as a  “(…) statistical test designed to identify markets where com-
petition problems exist and determine, if a  problem does exist, which firms 
in that market are involved in a conspiracy”. Harrington’s11 definition focuses 
on the monitoring process itself: “screening refers to a process whereby indus-
tries are identified for which the existence of a cartel is  likely. (…) Screening 
methods (are) designed to pick up the  transition from noncollusion to col-
lusion — looking for a  radical change in  firm behavior — or the  stationary 
collusive phase — finding differences in behavior from when firms compete”.
According to Abrantes-Metz and Bajari12, there are four desirable prop-
erties of a good screen:
1.  it should minimize the number of  false positives and negatives;
2. it should be easy to implement;
 9 R. Abrantes-Metz, Pro-active vs. Reactive Anti-Cartel Policy: the  Role of  Empirical Screens, 
„SSRN Electronic Journal”, No. 2013, pp 1–28.
 10 R. Abrantes-Metz, P. Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, 
„Antitrust”, Vol. 24, No. 1/2009, pp. 66–71.
 11 J.E. Harrington, Behavioral Screening and the Detection of Cartels, „European Competition 
Law Annual: 2006”. pp. 51–68.
 12 R. Abrantes-Metz, P. Bajari, op. cit., p. 66.
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3. it should be costly for agents to disguise such behavior;
4. it should have empirical support.
There is  substantial literature on  behavioral screening based on  various 
screening variables. Usually they include identification of  the  so-called collu-
sion markers (non-competitive behaviors) which are certain disturbances typ-
ical of a collusive agreement and concern the  following:
a.  relationships between players’ prices and changes in  the  demand 
on the market;
b. stability of prices and market shares;
c. relationships held between players’ prices;
d. investments made in production potential.
In general we can say thou, following Abrantes-Metz13, that screen, real-
izing postulates 1–4 from both lists could be based on any “(…) empirical ev-
idence in the market and its apparent irregularities” and “(…) combined with 
the  structural features of  this market, raise red flags for possible anticompet-
itive practices”.
3. the reSearch proceSS
As we stated before, we consider as very important presentation level of a 
screen. The  clearer message to receiver screen generates the  more influential 
and convincing it  is. We all know that one picture is worth thousand words 
(or numbers, sometimes). In a  research process we would like to inspect if 
there are some tools for a graphical assessment of possible collusion existence. 
We studied than three collusion cases and examples of screen and tools used. 
We considered them as potentially useful for graphical assessment of market 
manipulation or potentially collusive behavior of market players. In a flow of a 
research we give short description of  each case, then we present description 
and a  meaning of  a screen with reference to theoretical motivation, we note 
an econometric method in use and on the end of each case we analyze possi-
bilities of meaningful graphical output of a particular screen with a conjunc-
tion with proper quantitative tool.
 13 R. Abrantes-Metz, Aluminum Market Dislocation: Incentives, Structure and Reform, „SSRN 
Electronic Journal”, No. 2013, pp. 1–16.
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4. the reSultS of reSearch
4.1. case 1 (on a basis of bejger14) — polisH cement cartel
Case description: on  10th of  December 2009 the  Polish Office 
of  Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) announced in  press re-
lease the existence of a cartel in Polish cement industry15. This statement was 
a consequence of three year investigation. The President of the OCCP estab-
lished that 7 companies were engaged in the market sharing and price fixing 
practices in 1998–2009 period.
We wanted to examine possibility of  detection a  collusive behavior 
of  players on  a basis of market screen (ex post examination) using statistical 
data we can actually obtain.
Collusion screen description: price movement — seasonality “smooth-
ing”. In the  industry that exhibits seasonal fluctuations of  demand (which 
is an exogenous fact, know from economic theory) we can use seasonal price 
movement to detect or confirm cartel behavior of  the players. In a  collusion 
period seasonality of price is not maintained or substantially weakened. Price 
is  rigid when market is getting smaller.
motivation: Rotemberg and Saloner, supergame model developed 
in Bejger16.
analysis: as we can see from figure 1 demand (as a  proxy production 
data was used) exhibits clear monthly seasonality (also known from industry 
specifics). In comparison, price data did not follow that kind of market fluc-
tuations. Further estimation of  seasonality parameters confirmed that almost 
all of  the  seasonal parameters were significant in  a case of  demand and sig-
nificant seasonal factors we have for February and March only in a price se-
ries. Comparing to results we could conclude that price does not follow sea-
sonal shifts in production (demand). 
Conclusion: visual assessment of  figure 1 with screen of  “seasonal 
smoothing” as a  reference point implies abnormal behavior which could be 
warning of  collusion. Implied collusion period is  coherent with factual car-
tel existence.
 14 S. Bejger, Polish cement industry cartel — preliminary examination of  collusion existence, 
„Business and Economic Horizons”, Vol. 4/2011, pp. 88–107.
 15 See press release of Spokesperson for the OCCP from 10.12.2009.
 16 J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of  Business Cycles and Price Wars 
During Booms, „American Economic Review”, Vol.  76, No.  3/1986, pp.  390–407; S. Bejger, 
Collusion and seasonality of market price — a case of fixed market shares, „Business and Economic 
Horizons”, Vol 2/2010, pp. 48–59.
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Econometric tool: models of seasonality.
Graphical assessment (figure 1.).
Figure 1  . Case 1 graphical assessment of collusion — looking for seasonality distortion
Source: own preparation
4.2. case 2. (on a basis of bejger17) —lysine cartel
Case description: the collusion of lysine producers18 was proved in 1996. 
The test includes monthly average lysine prices on the USA market in the pe-
riod between 01/90–06/9619. Within this period, on the basis of collected ev-
idence20the following phases may be distinguished (table 1):
 17 Ibidem, pp. 48–59; S. Bejger, Econometric tools for detection of collusion equilibrium in the in-
dustry, „Dynamic Econometric Models”, Vol. 9/2009, pp. 34–45.
 18 Lysine is an basic amino acid required as a feed component in hog, poultry and fish pro-
duction.
 19 The prices are from J. Connor, Archer Daniels Midland: Price-fixer to the World, Staff paper 
No.  00–11, Department of  Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette 2000, 
appendix A, Table A2.
 20 Ibidem, pp. 1–364.
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Table 1. The statistics of  lysine price (prices per pound)
Phase Months number Average Standard deviation Coefficient of variation
1. Competition (01.90–07.92) 31 102.90 16.22 15.8%
2. Collusion (08.92–03.93) 8 90.13 9.83 10.9%
3. Competition (04.93–07.93) 4 70.50 7.72 11.0%
4. Collusion (08.93–06.95) 23 110.30 8.55 7.8%
5. Competition (07.95–06.96) 12 102.50 9.51 9.3%
Source: own preparation based on J. Connor, Archer Daniels Midland: Price-fixer to the World, Staff paper No. 00–11, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette 2000, pp. 1–364.
We have then 2 factual collusion phases.
We wanted to examine possibility of  detection a  collusive behavior 
of  players on  a basis of  two market screens (ex post examination) using sta-
tistical data we can actually obtain.
Collusion screen 1 description: price movement — seasonality “smooth-
ing”. In the  industry that exhibits seasonal fluctuations of  demand (which 
is an exogenous fact, know from economic theory) we can use seasonal price 
movement to detect or confirm cartel behavior of  the players. In a  collusion 
period seasonality of price is not maintained or substantially weakened. Price 
is  rigid when market is getting smaller.
motivation: Rotemberg and Saloner, supergame model developed 
in Bejger21.
Econometric tool: models of seasonality.
Graphical assessment (figure 2.).
 21 J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model…, op. cit., pp. 390–407; S. Bejger, 
Collusion and seasonality…, op. cit., pp. 48–59.
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Figure 2. Case 2 graphical assessment of collusion — looking for seasonality distortion
Source: own preparation
Analysis: we knew from market analysis22 that demand for lysine was 
seasonal with the lowest level in first five months of the year and 
the lowest prices in the summer months. Figure 2, especially chain 
index o price confirms that regularity, but we can see distinct break 
in such a movement of price in a period of second cartel phase. First 
cartel phase is too short to be pointed out by that screen. Anyway, ob-
served abnormality, in connection with motivation of the screen lead-
ed us to further investigation. We use simple regression (1) of price 
on constant and eleven seasonal (0–1) variables:
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𝑌𝑌?̂?𝑡 — average price of lysine; 
𝐷𝐷2𝑡𝑡,…,𝐷𝐷12𝑡𝑡 — seasonal dummies. 
 
and estimated it for a whole sample and in subsamples: subsample number one 
dated from January 1990 to August 1993 (non-cartel period) and subsample 
                                                 
21 J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model…, op. cit., pp. 390–407; S. Be-
jger, Collusion and seasonality…, op. cit., pp. 48–59. 
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21 J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model…, op. cit., pp. 390–407; S. Be-
jger, Collusion and seasonality…, op. cit., pp. 48–59. 
2  J. Connor, op. cit., pp. 24. 
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 Motivation: Rotemberg and Saloner, supergame model developed in Be-
jger21. 
 Econometric t ol: models of seasonality. 
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Figure 2. Case 2 graphical assessment of collusion — l oking for seasonality distortio 
Source: own preparation 
 Analysis: we knew from market analysis22 that demand for lysine was sea-
sonal with the lowest level in first five months of the year and the lowest prices 
in the summer months. Figure 2, especially chain index o price confirms that 
regularity, but we can s e distinct break in such a movement of price in a period 
of second cartel phase. First cartel phase is t o short to be pointed out by that 
scr en. Anyway, observed abnormality, in co nection with motivation of the 
scr en leaded us to further investigation. We use simple regression (1) of price 
on constant and eleven seasonal (0–1) variables: 
𝑌𝑌?̂?𝑦 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷2𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐷𝐷4𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐷𝐷5𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐷𝐷6𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐷𝐷7𝑡𝑡 +




𝑌𝑌?̂?𝑡 — er  i  of lysine; 
𝐷𝐷2𝑡𝑡,…,𝐷𝐷12𝑡𝑡 — seasonal dummies. 
 
and estimated it for a whole sample and in subsamples: subsample number one 
dated from January 1 90 to August 1 93 (non-cartel period) and subsample 
                                                 
21 J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model…, op. cit., pp. 390–407; S. Be-
jger, Collusion and seasonality…, op. cit., pp. 48–59. 
22 J. Connor, op. cit., pp. 24. 
  seasonal dummies.
and estimated it  for a  whole sample and in  subsamples: subsample number 
one dated from January 1990 to August 1993 (non-cartel period) and sub-
sample numbe  two dated from Septem er 1993 to June 1996 (d tect d car-
tel period). As the  results we observed statistically significant seasonal dum-
mies in the full sample (for June, July and August indicating a fall of average 
prices i  that months). That was confirmed for June and July in non-collusive 
subsample. Interestingly, all seasonal factors occurred insignificant in subsam-
ple 2 (collusive period) which means that seasonal fall of prices was eliminat-
ed, prices stayed rigid. This price movement (seasonality “smoothing”) is con-
sistent with the screen construction.
Conclusion: visual assessment of  figure 2 with screen of  “season-
al smoothing” as a  reference point detects abnormal behavior of  price se-
ries which could be warning of  collusion. Implied collusion period is  coher-
ent with factual cartel existence in a time frame which is  long enough to be 
noticed by the screen.
Collusion screen 2 description: well known collusion marker23 based 
on the analysis of changes in the variance of market price processes. It is based 
on  assumption that price process variance is  on  average lower for collusion 
phases and may undergo changes of  the regime type24.
motivation: Maskin and Tirole, Rotemberg and Saloner, Athey, Bagwell 
and Sanchirico25.
 23 Various so-called markers of  collusion has been described by J.E. Harrington, Detecting 
Cartels, [in:] P. Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook in  Antitrust Economics, MIT Press, London 2008, 
pp. 213–258.
 24 J. Connor, op. cit., pp. 1–364; R. Abrantes-Metz, L. Froeb, J. Geweke, C.T. Taylor, A vari-
ance screen for collusion, „International Journal of Industrial Organization”, Vol. 24, No. 3/2006, 
pp.  467–486; Y. Bolotova, J.M. Connor, D.J Miller, The  impact of  collusion on  price behavior: 
Empirical results from two recent cases, „International Journal of Industrial Organization”, Vol. 26, 
No. 6/2008, pp. 1290–1307; J.L. Jimenez, J. Perdiguero, Could Transport Costs be Lower? The Use 
of a Variance Screen to Evaluate Competition in the Petrol Market in Spain, „International Journal 
of  Transport Economics”, Vol.  38, No.  3/2011, pp.  265–284; R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, 
A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, Libor Manipulation?, „Journal of  Banking and Finance”, Vol.  36, 
No. 1/2012, pp. 136–150.
 25 E. Maskin, J. Tirole, A theory of dynamic oligopoly II, „Econometrica”, Vol. 56, No. 3/1988, 
pp.  571–599; J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, Collusive price leadership, „The Journal of  Industrial 
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Econometric tool: Markov switching model of  the  MSV type for 
the variance the price process.
Graphical assessment (figure 3.).
Figure 3. Case 2 graphical assessment of collusion — looking for variance switching distortion
Source: own preparation
analysis: The basis for figure 3 was estimated MSV model of Markov-
switching heteroskedasticity specification with invariant mean, intercept and 
autoregressive parameters (MSH in Krolzig terminology26) of general MS(M) 
specification. General formula of  this model is given by (2)27:
Economics”, Vol.  39, No.  1/1990, pp.  93–111; S. Athey, K. Bagwell, C. Sanchirico, Collusion 
and price rigidity, „Review of Economic Studies”, Vol. 71, No. 2/2004, pp. 317–349.
 26 H.M. Krolzig, Econometric Modelling of  Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions using 
MSVAR for Ox, 1998, http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/software/ox/Msvardoc.pdf (19.04.2015).
 27 As regards the specification and estimation methods see C.J. Kim, C.R Nelson., State-Space 
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Figure 3. Case 2 graphical assessment of collusion — looking for variance switching 
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 Analysis: The basis for Figure 3 was estimated MSV model of Markov-
switching heteroskedasticity specification with invariant mean, intercept and 
autoregressive parameters (MSH in Krolzig terminology26) of general MS(M) 
specification. General formula of this model is given by (2)27: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚=1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, (2) 
where: 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 ). 
                                                 
26 H.M. Krolzig, Econometric Modelling of Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions using 
MSVAR for Ox, 1998, http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/software/ox/Msvardoc.pdf (19.04.2015). 
27 As regards the specification and estimation methods see C.J. Kim, C.R Nelson., State-
Space Models with Regime Switching, MIT Press, London 1999; J. Davidson, Forecasting Mar-
kov-switching dynamic, conditionally heteroscedastic processes, „Statistic and Probability Let-
ters”, Vol. 68, No. 2/2004, pp. 137–147; J.D. Hamilton, A new approach to the economic analysis 
of nonstationary time series and the business cycle, „Econometrica”, Vol. 57, No. 2/1989, pp. 
357–384; J.D. Hamilton, R. Susmel, Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and changes in 
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 Analysis: The basis for Figure 3 was estimated MSV model of Markov-
switching heteroskedasticity specification with invariant mean, intercept and 
autoregressive parameters (MSH in Krolzig terminology26) of general MS(M) 
specification. General formula of this model is given by (2)27: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚=1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, (2) 
where: 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡2 ). 
                                                 
26 H.M. Krolzig, Econometric Modelling of Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions using 
MSVAR for Ox, 1998, http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/software/ox/Msvardoc.pdf (19.04.2015). 
27 As regards the specification and estimation methods see C.J. Kim, C.R Nelson., State-
Space Models with Regime Switching, MIT Press, London 1999; J. Davidson, Forecasting Mar-
kov-switching dynamic, conditionally heteroscedastic processes, „Statistic and Probability Let-
ters”, Vol. 68, No. 2/2004, pp. 137–147; J.D. Hamilton, A new approach to the economic analysis 
of nonstationary time series and the business cycle, „Econometrica”, Vol. 57, No. 2/1989, pp. 
357–384; J.D. Hamilton, R. Susmel, Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and changes in 
regime, „Journal of Econometrics”, Vol. 64, No. 1–2/1994, pp. 307–333; H.M. Krolzig, op. cit. 
.
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 In the model (2) r ter 𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are state independent. Only regime 
dependant parameter is variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 which is a rand m variable switched be-
tween the values from a finite set o  values pend ng on the current state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,…,𝑀𝑀. Variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be the exogenous, homogeneous 
Markov process with fixed transition probabilities {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖). 
 The MSV specification is coherent with screen functionality as it does not 
require observing (knowledge of) the state variable so it can serve for detecting 
of the variance regimes and objective determining of the switching moments, 
thou detecting the phases of collusive agreements and competition. We estimat-
ed the simplest specification of MSV(2)AR(1) to determine variance regimes 
only (if any). On the basis of estimated parameters values we concluded that 
there were two distinct regimes of high and low variance with statistically sig-
nificantly different non-zero values of parameters. Figure 3 shows the values of 
the observed variable and smoothed probabilities (i.e. conditional probabilities 
of the process is in state s2, while taking into account information from the en-
tire sample) for regime 2 of low variance, together with marked factual collu-
sion phases. As we can see there is a signal of regime change in period of first 
collusion phase and clear period of low variance (high probability of regime 2) 
in the beginning of second collusive phase. 
 Conclusion: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of variance switching 
as a reference point detects and point to some periods of behavior of price series 
which could be warning of collusion. Implied collusion period is pointed in 
general accordance with factual collusion existence, however could not be treat 
as precise marking of cartel agreement but as preliminary leads for further in-
vestigation. 
4.3. CASE 3 (ON A BASIS OF ABRANTES-METZ AND METZ) 
 Case description: very recently in 2008, empirical screens flagged the pos-
sibility of a conspiracy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by major world-
wide banks. Wall Street Journal first looked at LIBOR and found suspicious 
patterns in April and May of 2008. Next works of Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow28, followed by empirical evidence provided in Snider and Youle, 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas and Abrantes-Metz and Metz29 described 
and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 screens preceded 
worldwide investigations on the matter which became public in March 2011. 
                                                 
28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150. 
29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol. 18, No. 10/2011, pp. 893–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. 
Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Detecting Explicit Collusion? New Evidence From the Libor 
Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9. 
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 In the model (2) parameters 𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are state independent. Only regim  
dependant parameter is variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 which is a random variable switched be-
tween the values from a finite set of values depending on the current state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,…,𝑀𝑀. Variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be the exogenous, homogeneous 
Markov process with fixed transition probabilities {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖). 
 The MSV specification is coherent with screen functionality as it does not 
require observing (knowledge of) the state variable so it can serve for detecting 
of the variance regimes and objective determining of the switching moments, 
thou detecting the phases of collusive agreements and competition. We estimat-
ed the simplest specification of MSV(2)AR(1) to determine variance regimes 
only (if any). On the basis of estimated parameters values we concluded that 
there were two distinct regimes of high and low variance with statistically sig-
nificantly different non-zero values of parameters. Figure 3 shows the values of 
the observed variable and smoothed probabilities (i.e. conditional probabilities 
of the process is in state s2, while taking into account information from the en-
tire sample) for regime 2 of low variance, together with marked factual collu-
sion phases. As we can see there is a signal of regime change in period of first 
collusion phase and clear period of low variance (high probability of regime 2) 
in the beginning of second collusive phase. 
 Conclusion: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of variance switching 
as a reference point detects and point to some periods of behavior of price series 
which could be warning of collusion. Implied collusion period is pointed in 
general accordance with factual collusion existence, however could not be treat 
as precise marking of cartel agreement but as preliminary leads for further in-
vestigation. 
4.3. CASE 3 (ON A BASIS OF ABRANTES-METZ AND METZ) 
 Case description: very recently in 2008, empirical screens flagged the pos-
sibility of a conspiracy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by major world-
wide banks. Wall Street Journal first looked at LIBOR and found suspicious 
patterns in April and May of 2008. Next works of Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow28, followed by empirical evidence provided in Snider and Youle, 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas and Abrantes-Metz and Metz29 described 
and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 screens preceded 
worldwide investigations on the matter which became public in March 2011. 
                                                 
28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150. 
29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol. 18, No. 10/2011, pp. 893–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. 
Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Detecting Explicit Collusion? New Evidence From the Libor 
Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9. 
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 In the model (2) parameters 𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are stat  independe t. Only regime 
depe dant parameter is variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 hich is a random variable switch d be-
tween the values from a finite set of valu s depe di g on the curren  state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
here 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,…,𝑀𝑀. Variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 i  assumed to b  he exogenou , homogeneous 
Markov process with fixed transition probabilities {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} wher  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖). 
 The MSV specification is coherent with scree  functionality as it does not 
require observing (knowledge of) the state variable so it can serve for detecting 
of the variance regimes and objective determining of the switching moments, 
thou detecting t e phases f collusive agr ements and competition. We estimat-
ed the simplest specification of MSV(2)AR(1) to determine variance regimes 
only (if any). On the basis of estimated parameters values we concluded that 
there were two distinct regimes of high and low variance with tatistically sig-
nificantly different non-zero values of parameters. Figure 3 shows the values of 
the obser ed variable and smoothed probabilities (i.e. conditional probabilities 
of the process i  in state s2, while taki g into account information from the en-
tire sample) for regime 2 of low variance, together with marked f ctual collu-
sion phase . As we can see there is a signal of regime change in period of first 
collusion ph se and clear period of low variance (high probability of regime 2) 
in the beginning of second collusive phase. 
 Conclusion: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of variance switching 
as a reference point detects and point to some peri ds of behavior of price series 
which could be warning f collusion. Implied collusion period is pointed in 
general accordance with f ctual collusion existence, however could not be treat 
as precise marking of cartel agr ement but as preliminary leads for further in-
vestigation. 
4.3. CASE 3 (ON  BASIS OF BRANTES-METZ AND METZ) 
 Case description: very recently in 2008, empiri al screens flagged the pos-
sibility of a conspir cy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by major world-
wide banks. Wall Street Journal first looked at LIBOR and found suspicious 
patterns in April and May of 2008. Next works of Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow28, followed by empirical vidence provided in Snider and Youle, 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas and Abrantes-Metz and Metz29 described 
and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 screens pr ceded 
worldwide investigati s on the matter which became public in March 2011. 
                                                 
28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 36–150. 
29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol. 18, No. 10/2011, pp. 3–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. 
Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Detecting Explicit C llusion? New Evidence From the Libor 
Setting, „Competition Policy Inter atio al An itrust Chronicle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9. 
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In th  odel (2) parameters 𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are state independent. Only regime 
depend t parameter is v ri ce 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 which i  a ran om variable switched be-
tween the values from a finite set f values d pending on the current state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
wher  𝑡𝑡=1,…,𝑀𝑀. Variable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is assum d to be the xogenous, homoge eous 
Markov roce s with fixed transition pr babilities {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖). 
 The MSV specif cation is coherent w th creen functi nality as it oes not 
require observing (knowledg of) he state variable so it can serve for detecting 
of the variance regimes and objective deter ining of the switching moments, 
thou detecting the phases of collusive agreements and competition. We estimat-
ed the simplest specification of MSV(2)AR(1) to determine variance regimes 
only (if any). On the b sis of estimated parameters values we concluded that 
there were two disti ct regimes of high and low variance with statistically sig-
nificantly different non-z o values of parameters. Figure 3 shows the values of 
the observed variable and smoothed probabilities (i.e. conditional probabilities 
of the process is in state s2, while taking nto account information from the en-
tire sample) fo  regime 2 of lo  variance, toge her with marked factual collu-
sion phases. As we c n see ther is  signal of regime change in period of first 
collusion phase and clear period of low variance (h gh probability of regime 2) 
in the beginning of second collusive phase. 
 Co clusi n: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of variance switching 
as a reference point detects an  point to some pe ods of behavior of price series 
which could be warning of collusion. Implied collusio period is pointed in 
general accordance with factual collusion existence, however could not be treat 
as pr cise marking of cartel agreement but as preliminary leads for further in-
vestigation. 
4.3. CASE 3 (O  A BASIS OF ABRANTES-METZ AND METZ) 
 Case descr ption: v ry recently in 2008, empirical screens flagged the pos-
sibility of a conspiracy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by major world-
wide banks. Wall Str et Journal first looked at LIBOR and found suspicious 
patterns in April and May  2008. Next works of Abran es-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow28, followed by empirical evidence provided in Snider and Youle, 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas and Abrant -Metz and Metz29 described 
and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 screens preceded 
worldwide investigations on the matter which became public in March 2011. 
                                
28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150. 
29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowi g Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol. 18, No 10/2011, pp. 893–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. 
Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Detecting Explicit Collusion? New Evidence From the Libor 
Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9. 
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 In the model (2) parameters 𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are stat  ind pendent. Only regime 
pendant parameter is v riance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 which is a rand m v riabl  switched be-
tw en th  values from a finite set o  values pending on the curr  state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡=1,…,𝑀𝑀. V riable 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 i assumed to be the exogenous, h mog neous 
Markov process with fixed transition pro abiliti  {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} w re 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑖𝑖). 
 The MSV specification is coher n  wi h screen functionality as it does not 
require observing (knowl dge of) the state v riable so it can serve for detecting 
of the v riance regimes and objective d termining of the switching moments, 
thou detecting the p ases of collusive agreements and competition. e esti at-
ed the simple t sp cification of MSV(2)AR(1) t  determine v riance regi es 
only (if any). On the basis of estimated parameter  values we conclu ed that 
there ere two d s inct regimes f high and low v riance with sta stically sig-
nificantly differe t on-zero values of parameters. Figure 3 shows the valu s of 
the observed v riabl  and smoothed pro abilities (i.e. conditional pro abilities 
of the proces s in state s2, while taking into account informa ion fr m the en-
tire sample) for reg me 2 of low v rianc , together with marked factual collu-
sion phases. As we ca  see there is a sig al of regime change in period of first 
collusion phase and clear period of low v riance (high pro ab lity of regime 2) 
in the beginning of second collusive phase. 
 Conclusion: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of v riance witching 
s a reference point detects and point  some periods of behavi r of pric  s ries 
which could be warn ng of collusion. Implied co lusion period is pointed in 
g ner l accordance with factual collusion existence, how ver could not be treat 
as precise marking of cartel agreement but as prel minary leads fo  further in-
vestigation. 
4.3. CASE 3 (ON A BASIS OF ABRANTES-METZ ND METZ) 
 Case description: very r cently in 2008, empirical screens flagged the pos-
sibility of a conspiracy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by major world-
wide banks. Wall Stre t Journal first looked at LIBOR and found uspicious 
patterns in April and May of 2008. Next works of Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow28, f llowe by empirical evidence provi ed in S ider and Youle, 
Abrantes-Metz, Judge d Villas-Bo s and Abrantes-Metz and Metz29 described 
and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 scre ns pr c ed 
worldwide investigations on the matter which beca e public in March 2011. 
                                             
28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. G. . Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150. 
29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ B rr wing Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol. 18, No. 1 /2011, pp. 893–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. 
Metz, How Far Can Scre ns G  in De ecting Explicit Collusion? New Ev dence From the Libor 
Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chro icle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9. 
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 I  t e l t  𝛼𝛼0, 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 are st te i e e t. l  re i e 
  aria ce 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 ic  s a ra  aria le s itc e  e-
e l   fi it  s t f al i   t e c r t state 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
ere 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 , ,𝑀𝑀. aria le 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is as e  t  e s, e s 
ar  r c s it  fi e  tra siti r a ilities {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} ere 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 1 𝑖𝑖). 
 e s ecificati  s c ere t i  s ree  f ti ali  as  s t
re ire ser i  ( le  f) t sta e aria le s  it ca ser e f r tecti  
f t e aria ce re i es a  ject e et r i i  f t e s itc  e ts,
 etecti  t e as s f c ll si e a re e ts a  c etiti . e esti at-
e  t e si le t s ecificati  f ( )  t  eter i e aria ce re i es 
l  (if a ). t e asis f e ti ate  ra eter al es e c l e  t at 
t ere re t  isti c  re i es f i  a  l  aria ce it  s atisticall  si -
ifica tl  iffere t -zer  l es  ara eters. i re  s s t e al s f 
t e ser e  aria le a  s t e  r a i ities (i.e. c iti al r a ilities
f t e r c ss is i  state s , ile ta  t  cc t i f r at fr  t e e -
tire sa le) f r re i e  f l  aria ce, t et er it  ar e  fact al c l -
si  ases.  e ca  see t re is a i l f re i e c a e i  eri f first
c ll si  ase a  clear e i  f l  ria c  ( i  r a ilit  f re i e ) 
i  t e e i i  f sec  c ll si e as . 
 cl si : s al i s ecti  f fi re  it  cree  f aria ce s itc  
as a refe ce i t e ects a  i t t  s e eri s f e a i r f ric  se es
ic  c l  e ar i  f c ll si . I lie  c ll si  eri  is i te  i  
e eral acc r ce it  fact al c l si  e ste ce, e er c l t e trea  
as recis  ar i  f cartel a ee e t t as reli i a  lea s f r t e  i -
esti a . 
4.3. 3 (  I  -   ) 
 se escri ti : er  rece tl  i  , e i ical scree  fla e  t e s-
si ilit  f a c s irac  a  i l ti  f t e  I   aj r rl -
i e a s. all tree  J r al fi st l e  at I  a  f  s s ici s 
atter s i  r l a   f . e t r s f ra tes- tz, rate , etz 
a  e 28, f ll e   e irical e i e c  r i e  i  i er a le, 
ra tes- etz, J e a  illas- as a  ra tes- etz a  etz29 scri e  
a  i   i te  e I  c s irac . i itial  sc ee  r ce e  
rl i e esti a s  t e att r ic  eca e lic i  arc  . 
      
28 . brantes- etz, . raten, . . etz, .S. Seo , p. cit., p  136–150. 
29 . Snider, . oule, es th Libor flect anks’ rro ing osts?, „SS  lectronic 
Journal”, o. 2010, pp. –25; . brantes- etz , S. . i las- oas, . Judg , Tracking the Libor 
ate, „ pplied cono i s e ter ” ol. 18, o. 10/2011, pp. 893–899; . brantes- etz, . . 
etz, o  ar n Scree s o i  etecting xplicit o lusi n? e  vidence ro  the Libor 
Se ting, „ o petition P licy Int rnation l ntitrust hronicle”, ol. 1/20 2, pp. –9. 
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The MSV specification is  coherent with screen functionality as it  does 
not require observing (knowledge of ) the  state variable so it  can serve for 
detecting of  the  variance regimes and objective determining of  the  switch-
ing moments, thou detecting the  phases of  collusive agreements and com-
petition. We estimated the  simplest specification of MSV(2)AR(1) to deter-
mine varianc  regimes only (if any). On the  basis of  stimated parameters 
values we concluded that there were two d stinct regimes of  high and ow 
variance with statistic lly significantly differe t non-zero values f paramet rs. 
Figure 3 shows the valu s o  the observed variable and smooth  p obabilities 
( .e. c dition l probabiliti s of   proce  is in state s2, whil t king into ac-
ount information from th   entir  sample) for regim  2 of  l  riance, to-
gether with marked factual collusion phases. As we can see there is  a signal 
of  regime change in  period of  first collusion phase and clear period of  low 
variance (high probability of  regime 2) in  the  beginning of  second collusive 
phase.
Conclusion: visual inspection of figure 3 with screen of variance switch-
ing as a reference point detects and point to some periods of behavior of price 
series which could be warning of collusion. Implied collusion period is point-
ed in  general accordance with factual collusion existence, however could not 
be treat as precise marking of  cartel agreement but as preliminary leads for 
further inv tigation.
switching dynamic, conditionally heteroscedastic processes, „Statistic and Probability Letters”, Vol. 68, 
No. 2/2004, pp. 137–147; J.D. Hamilton, A new approach to the economic analysis of nonstatio -
ary time series and the  business cycle, „Econometrica”, Vol.  57, No.  2/1989, pp.  357–384; J.D. 
Hamilton, R. Susmel, Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and changes in  r gime, „Journal 
of Econometrics”, Vol. 64, No. 1–2/1994, pp. 307–333; H.M. Krolzig, op. cit.
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4.3. case 3 (on a basis of abrantes-metz and metz)
Case description: very recently in  2008, empirical screens flagged 
the possibility of a conspiracy and manipulation of the USD LIBOR by ma-
jor worldwide banks. Wall Street Journal first looked at LIBOR and found 
suspicious patterns in April and May of 2008. Next works of Abrantes-Metz, 
Kraten, Metz and Seow28, followed by empirical evidence provided in Snider 
and Youle, Abrantes-Metz, Judge and Villas-Boas and Abrantes-Metz and 
Metz29 described and pin — pointed the LIBOR conspiracy. The initial 2008 
screens preceded worldwide investigations on the matter which became pub-
lic in March 2011. Only late in  the Spring of  2011, did one of  the LIBOR 
panel contributing banks, UBS, file for leniency with the  U.S. Department 
of  Justice. We could say that this is  crucial and convincing example how 
screening should work and what is its place in anticompetitive behavior detec-
tion. Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow30 applied several different screen-
ing methods to determine if the U.S. dollar 1-month LIBOR rate had been 
manipulated by banks. The  analysis is  based on  the  comparison of  LIBOR 
with other short-term borrowing rates, and analysis of individual bank quotes, 
and the  comparison of  individual quotes to the  credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads during three different time periods. We wanted to include in this pa-
per the  simplest but graphical and thou very meaningful example of  screen 
connected with LIBOR conspiracy.
Collusion screen description: collusion marker based on  the  analysis 
of changes in  the variance of a series in consideration.
motivation: Maskin and Tirole, Rotemberg and Saloner, Athey, Bagwell 
and Sanchirico31.
Econometric tool: analysis of variance.
Graphical assessment (figure 4.).
 28 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150.
 29 C. Snider, T. Youle, Does the  Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs?, „SSRN Electronic 
Journal”, No. 2010, pp. 1–25; R. Abrantes-Metz , S.B. Villas-Boas, G. Judge, Tracking the Libor 
Rate, „Applied Economics Letters”, Vol.  18, No.  10/2011, pp.  893–899; R. Abrantes-Metz, 
A.D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in  Detecting Explicit Collusion? New Evidence From 
the Libor Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle”, Vol. 1/2012, pp. 1–9.
 30 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, Seow G.S., op. cit., pp. 136–150.
 31 E. Maskin, J. Tirole, op. cit., pp.  571–599; J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, Collusive price…, 
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Only late in the Spring of 2011, did one of the LIBOR panel contributing banks, 
UBS, file for leniency with the U.S. Department of Justice. We could say that 
this is crucial and convincing example how screening should work and what is 
its place in anticompetitive behavior detection. Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz 
and Seow30 applied several different screening methods to determine if the U.S. 
dollar 1-month LIBOR rate had been manipulated by banks. The analysis is 
based on the comparison of LIBOR with other short-term borrowing rates, and 
analysis of individual bank quotes, and the comparison of individual quotes to 
the credit default swap (CDS) spreads during three different time periods. We 
wanted to include in this paper the simplest but graphical and thou very mean-
ingful example of screen connected with LIBOR conspiracy. 
 Collusion screen description: collusion marker based on the analysis of 
changes in the variance of a series in consideration. 
 Motivation: Maskin and Tirole, Rotemberg and Saloner, Athey, Bagwell 
and Sanchirico31. 
 Econometric tool: analysis of varianc . 
 Graphical assessment (figure 4.). 
 
Figure 4.Coefficient of variation for the set of LIBOR quotes. 
Source: Figure 1 from R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Detecting Explicit 
Collusion? New Evidence From the Libor Setting, „Competition Policy International Antitrust Chroni-
cle”, Vol. 1/2012. pp. 1–9. 
 Analysis: Abrantes-Metz and Metz32 calculated the coefficient of variation 
for the determining set of LIBOR quotes each day which measures the variabil-
                                                 
30 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, Seow G.S., op. cit., pp. 136–150. 
31 E. Maskin, J. Tirole, op. cit., pp. 571–599; J.J. Rotemberg, G. Saloner, Collusive price…, 
op. cit. leadership, pp. 93–111; S. Athey, K. Bagwell, C. Sanchirico, op. cit., pp. 317–349. 
Figure 4. Coefficient of variation for the set of LIBOR quotes.
Source: Figure 1 from R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in  Detecting Explicit Col-
lusion? New Evid nce From the Libor Setting, „Competition P  t rnational Anti rust Chronic-
le”, Vol. 1/2012. pp. 1–9.
analysis: Abran es-Metz and Metz32 calculated the  coefficient of  v ri-
ation for the  determining set of  LIBOR quotes each day which measures 
the varia ility in the daily quotes of the participating banks. For the first look 
it  is obvious that hat from early August 2006 through early August 2007 
there is  period with very low variance of  quotes. This means of  course that 
banks were all submitting essentially the  same quote in  that period, in  con-
trary to period before and after. Obviously that was a clear example of parallel 
pricing, which itself is not an evidence of collusion, but with some “plus” fac-
tor (additional evidences from economic environment) could be. Such a shift 
in a process variance should be a “red flag” for sure and, as in Abrantes-Metz 
and Metz33 was followed by further investigation. Finally, their research was 
devoted to proving that such “parallel” behavior of banks had to be caused by 
explicit rather than tacit collusion, but for our paper it  is very clear example 
of usability (and importance) of simple but suggestive (and convincing, when 
properly commented) graphical methods of collusion detection34.
 32 R. Abrantes-Metz, A.D. Metz, op. cit., pp. 1–9.
 33 Ibidem.
 34 Similar, preliminary graphical reasoning, was used in  R. Abrantes-Metz, Aluminum 
Market…, op. cit., pp. 1–16 for aluminum market.
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Conclusion: visual inspection of  figure 4 with some knowledge about 
screen of variance functionality should be (and in LIBOR case, was) clear sig-
nal of market anomalous behavior. If we have anticompetitive behavior in mind, 
such graph should evidently trigger further investigation of  relevant market.
concluSionS
As anticompetitive horizontal behaviors are very common and harmful 
for economy as a whole, and additionally recently were discovered in  a mar-
kets we have never been expected such a practices. If such behaviors in most 
cases mean collusion there is a need for methods of collusion detection which 
would be quick, resource — saving and understandable for economists, experts 
and lawyers without quantitative experience. We described here fairly sim-
ple but meaningful, graphical tools which could be used in process of screen-
ing for collusive behavior in  the  markets. We have to underline that ability 
of  graphical inspection depends on  statistical/econometric tool of  choice for 
particular screen, so we see a  need for research and popularization of  tools 
with that property. When for scientific hypothesis testing we need precise 
numbers and carefully calibrated models, simple graphics could be very in-
teresting for wide range of  persons who participate in  anticompetitive pro-
cedures and want to make quick evaluation of  the  situation. Our discussion 
is  complementary to a  path of  research on  methods of  anticompetitive be-
havior detection, especially on screen’s application. In Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, 
Metz and Seow35 they observed very distinct patterns on various graphs that 
enhanced for additional statistical research, even more illustrative approach36 
was used in Abrantes-Metz. What is our point, and as we hope added value 
of  that paper it  is underlining and focusing on  visual output of  various rea-
sonable selected quantitative methods connected with good theoretically mo-
tivated screens of market manipulation. We can say that such a  visualization 
should be used as an “economic background” of anticompetitive cases not only 
in well known, quasi-experimental methods framework, including in particular 
the Difference in Difference method often used in such a context (which do 
not reflect economic theory but are data-driven) but in a more sophisticated 
research, as well. Even a body of the research is quite complicated we can al-
most always find a graphical representation of main idea which could be self-
explained or need very short comment to be understandable.
 35 R. Abrantes-Metz, M. Kraten, A.D. Metz, G.S. Seow, op. cit., pp. 136–150.
 36 R. Abrantes-Metz, Aluminum Market…, op. cit., pp. 1–16.
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Anticompetitive horizontal behaviors are very common and harmful for 
economy as a whole and consumer welfare especially. Such behaviors in most 
cases mean collusion. Pro-active anticompetitive policy we want to realize im-
plies monitoring of huge set of markets and industries. As preliminary selec-
tion is possible on a basis of number of factors that enhanced collusion, there 
could be still big set of  industries left. There is  a necessity then for methods 
of collusion’s detection which would be quick, resource — saving and under-
standable for economists, experts and lawyers without quantitative experience. 
We described here fairly simple but meaningful, graphical tools which could 
be used in process of screening for collusive behavior in the markets. We un-
derlined that ability of graphical inspection depends on statistical/econometric 
tool of  choice for particular screen, so we see a need for research and popu-
larization of  tools with that property. In Abrantes-Metz and Bajari37 we can 
read: “As screens become more popular, and more data and computer power 
are available, their use by agencies, plaintiffs, and defendants is  likely to play 
an ever increasing role in antitrust litigation”. We can derive a similar propos-
al in  relation to a  graphical analysis approach. We could imagine that with 
progress in  in-memory computing and big data analytics tools with very in-
tuitive user experiences38 such way of detection and assessment of potentially 
anticompetitive behavior will quickly evolve.
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